Abstract. A group signature scheme allows group members to issue signatures on behalf of the group, while hiding for each signature which group member actually issued it. Such scheme also involves a group manager, who is able to open any group signature by showing which group member issued it. We introduce the concept of list signatures as a variant of group signatures which sets a limit on the number of signatures each group member may issue. These limits must be enforced without having the group manager open signatures of honest group members-which excludes the trivial solution in which the group manager opens every signature to see whether some group members exceed their limits. Furthermore, we consider the problem of publicly identifying group members who exceed their limits, also without involving the group manager.
Introduction
The basic functionality of a group signature scheme, as introduced by Chaum and Van Heyst [20] , is to allow members of a group to issue signatures on behalf of the group, while hiding for each signature which group member actually issued it. In addition it must be possible for a group manager to open any signature issued on behalf of the group, by showing which member issued it.
The group manager is therefore in a powerful position and must be trusted not to revoke the anonymity of group members without permission. To lower the trust in the group manager it may be implemented in a distributed fashion (using threshold cryptography) such that signatures are only opened if a majority of the proxies (or, shareholders) agrees to do so.
In this paper we study methods to extend the functionality of group signatures while limiting the involvement of the group manager as much as possible. We introduce the notion of public detection, which in its simplest form enables any party to detect if a group member attempts to issue more than one signature on behalf of the group. Obviously, this problem can be solved by having the group manager open every signature to check whether a group member signed twice. In that case, however, all signatures by honest group members are also opened. Loosely speaking, we define a list signature scheme as a group signature scheme with public detection, without using a group manager's private key for this purpose. To prevent the need to continuously rekey the scheme, we let signatures depend on a time frame and only require detection of signatures of the same user within the same time frame (and unlinkability otherwise). 4 modulus. The multiplicative group of quadratic residues modulo n is denoted by QR(n), which is a cyclic group of order p q .
The flexible RSA problem is defined as finding a u ∈ QR(n) and an integer e, e > 1, such that u e = y mod n, for given y and n. Solving the flexible RSA problem is easy if one knows the prime factorisation of n. The strong RSA assumption states that given only y and n, the flexible RSA problem is hard to solve.
Decision Diffie-Hellman Assumption. Let G be a finite cyclic group, and let g denote a generator of G. The Decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption for group G states that it is hard to solve the DDH problem, i.e., to distinguish so-called Diffie-Hellman triples (g x , g y , g xy ) from random triples (g x , g y , g z ), for random x, y, z modulo the order of group G.
More generally, the DDH problem may also be formulated for arbitrary finite abelian groups, which are not necessarily cyclic. In particular, if G = QR(n), then G has composite order and for those knowing the group decomposition of G (i.e., knowing the prime factorisation of n), the DDH problem in G reduces to the DDH problem in the respective components of G. That is, the DDH problem in G is hard if and only if it is hard in all of its components, which is the case, e.g., if n is a safe 2048-bit RSA modulus, as we will use further on in this paper.
Proving Subset Relations for Sets of Discrete Logs
Let G q be a group of prime order q. Suppose f and g are generators of G q such that log g f is unknown. We present an efficient zero-knowledge proof of membership for the language consisting of tuples (a 1 , . . . , a M , y 1 , . . . , y N ) ∈ G M +N q , 1 ≤ M ≤ N , satisfying
We note that for our applications we only need the case M = 1.
Before doing so, let us give a quick reminder of the tools we need. Knowledge of a discrete logarithm can be proved using Schnorr's protocol [30] . For the remainder of this section, we use the work for a Schnorr proof as our unit of work (that is, the work to either generate a Schnorr proof, or to verify a Schnorr proof, or to compute an honest-verifier simulation of a Schnorr proof is taken as one unit of work). Chaum and Pedersen [19] proposed an extension to prove equality (and knowledge) of discrete logarithms; the work for such a proof of equality amounts to the work of two Schnorr proofs. Finally, Cramer, Damgård and Schoenmakers [21] have given a technique to prove that 1-out-of-N statements holds, without revealing which statement actually holds (in fact, their technique is more general). The work for such a proof is roughly equal to N times the work for proving a single statement.
We now return to a proof for the language we described. If M = N = 1 the language coincides with the language for the Chaum-Pedersen proof mentioned above. For the general case, it is possible to directly apply the technique for proving 1-out-of-N relations using the Chaum-Pedersen proof as the basic proof to show that log f a j ∈ {log g y i | 1 ≤ i ≤ N }, for j = 1, . . . , M . Indeed this is the approach followed by [13, 22] to construct proofs for similar statements. However, the total work for the proof becomes approximately 2M N times the work for a Schnorr proof.
We obtain an improved protocol by breaking up the proof in a different way. As a result we are able the reduce the total work roughly by a factor of two, reducing it from 2M N to M N + M + N times the work of a Schnorr proof.
The protocol is based on the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Suppose log g f is unknown. If one knows witnesses u 1 , . . . , u M , v 1 , . . . , v N , and w 1 , . . . , w M satisfying
Proof. Consider any j, 1 ≤ j ≤ M . Let i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , be such that a j y i = (f g) w j , for witness w j . Then also f u j g v i = (f g) w j , for witnesses u j and v i . This implies that one may compute log g f as
Since we assume that log g f is unknown, (4) must hold.
Therefore, in order to prove that (4) holds, it suffices to prove that (1)-(3) hold. For (1) and (2) we need M and N Schnorr proofs, respectively. Statement (3) can be proved using the technique for proving 1-out-of-N relations, requiring the work of M N Schnorr proofs.
We will apply Lemma 1 in Section 6 to obtain an efficient signing algorithm for our list signature scheme, where we take advantage of the fact that the N proofs for (2) have already been given at an earlier stage. Lemma 1 can also be used to speed up Camenisch' group signature scheme [13] or multiway elections [22] by a factor of two.
List Signatures: Definition
We now move to a new type of signature scheme, which has as defining feature that signatures within a certain time frame are linkable. More precisely, if a single user signs twice within the same time frame, the two signatures can be efficiently linked. Signatures of the same user in different time frames remain unlinkable though. A stronger version allows public retrieval of the identities of users who sign twice within a time frame without the intervention of a group manager. Because we regard double-signing as bad behaviour, we only define a minimum penalty (either detection or identification). We do not require that the damage stops there, it might very well be that double-signing in fact results in full traceability of that user's signatures or even the ability of anyone to sign on that user's behalf. Needless to say, it is possible to pinpoint the penalty of double-signing more precisely (note that in the real/ideal-model this is achieved automatically [11] ).
With respect to group management, we opt for a slightly less traditional approach. First of all, we assume that there is already a legally binding PKI in place which enables users to identify themselves in a committing way. Secondly we assume that any group public key also implicitly defines the qualified group members under that key. This assumption makes it easier to define security for dynamic groups (either ad hoc schemes or schemes allowing revocation). Even for schemes that claim a constant size group key, such as the one by Ateniese et al. [2] the public key satisfies this property if the transcripts of the Join-protocols are regarded as part of the public key. As noted by Dodis et al. [23] it is not so much the size of the theoretical group public key that matters, but rather the information that is actually needed to sign and verify signatures (assuming that it has already been checked that this information is part of a valid and relevant group public key).
For our definition of list signatures we extend the existing model for group signatures (see [20, 13] ) with protocols for detection and identification and taking into account some recent developments regarding the definition of group signatures [26, 6, 5 ] and the discussion above.
A list signature scheme involves various entities: a group manager M who is responsible for the group's public key and users i who will be group members. A list signature scheme thus comprises protocols for the following tasks:
Key generation which produces the group's public key used to verify signatures, a private key for each group member, and a private key for the group manager. Typically key generation consists of a Setup protocol to initialize the system that will output the private key of the group manager and some related public information; an interactive Join protocol between a user i and the group manager after which the user becomes a member of the group, legally bound by its own signature using an existing PKI; a Revoke protocol that the group manager can use to revoke a member; and an Update protocol that group users can use to update their private key after a change in the public key as a consequence of another user joining or leaving the qualified group of members. Sign to produce a signature on input of a message, a time frame, the group's public key, and a group member's private key. Verify which takes as input a message, a time frame, a signature and the group's public key and accepts if and only if the signature is valid for that message and time frame. Open which is used by the group manager to prove that a group member did or did not produce a signature. Match to determine whether out of a list of signatures based on the same time frame two (or, in general, k) signatures were produced by the same person (called detection procedure) and, for schemes with identification, by whom.
Note that a scheme with opening but without detection or identification is the traditional group signature scheme. A scheme with detection or identification but not necessarily with the capability of opening is called a list signature scheme.
Below, we consider three security properties: correctness, soundness, and anonymity. For soundness we make a distinction between group signatures, list signatures and the combination of both. We only describe the properties informally and do not precisely state the capabilities of the adversary. In a formalization, the adversary will typically be modelled as a probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine run on input 1 λ (for a security parameter λ) that is allowed to introduce honest and corrupt users to the system, corrupt honest players, have honest players revoked, ask honest players for signatures and, if applicable, ask for signatures to be opened.
The only limitations we pose on the adversary are that it can only query one signature per honest user per time frame and it cannot ask for opening a challenge signature (in the anonymity game). We are also cautious about allowing corruption of the group manager, especially since the group manager can be split according to functionality (e.g., into a manager for joining and a manager for revocation). In the schemes presented below we will be more concrete about the level of corruption that the scheme can cope with.
Correctness Firstly, an adversary cannot prevent honest group members from producing valid signatures, and, secondly, an adversary cannot cause the detection of the signatures of an honest group member. Soundness An adversary can produce at most one valid signature per time frame per corrupted player without being detected, or without the identity of a corrupted group member being released. Note that signatures obtained from querying honest signers do not count as produced by the adversary.
(If applicable, an adversary cannot produce a valid signature that does not open to a corrupted player.) Anonymity Given a set of signatures over different time frames, the adversary cannot determine whether two of them were produced by the same person.
Note that in the case of identification the second clause of correctness is superfluous. An adversary capable of causing identification of honest users already breaches anonymity. The detectability feature of list signature schemes automatically implies that theoretically group members can disavow or claim a signature without the need to know the randomness that created it, based on the well-known result that all of N P can be proven in zero-knowledge. As pointed out by Camenisch [15] , this has the side-effect that a coalition encompassing all users but one, can prove that a signature originated from the last remaining honest user. In ordinary group signature schemes, this should not be possible.
Basic Ideas for Realizing List Signature Schemes
In this section we informally describe how to adapt group signature schemes into list signature schemes. We will concentrate on detectability, since getting rid of the opening facility of group signatures, if required, is usually relatively straightforward. In the literature two important types of group signatures exist, those whose efficiency is (largely) independent of the group size and those for which this is not the case, typically resulting in linear dependency on the group size. Interestingly, most large group signature schemes are based on the Strong RSA assumption coupled with (a version of) the DDH assumption. Small group signature schemes can be easily implemented based on groups in which the DDH problem is assumed hard.
Let us define some notation and terminology. We let G be a group of possibly unknown order in which the DDH problem is assumed to be hard, even if the group decomposition of G is known. We also assume the existence of a hash function H : {0, 1} * → G. Furthermore, we observe that in all group signature schemes we are aware of each user has a unique private exponent x i , not necessarily reduced modulo the group order.
Detection. The basic idea for performing detection is simple. Given the description of a time frame T , the user computes and publishes H(T ) x i , along with a NIZK-proof that the same private key was used for the computation of H(T ) x i and the rest of the signature. Note that most, if not all, known constructions of group signatures already employ a NIZK-proof involving x i during the signing state and that adapting these proofs can always be done theoretically and quite efficiently in practice (which will become clear from our examples).
It is intuitively clear that an otherwise honest signer who signs twice in the same time frame will be caught since the values of H(T ) x i will collide in these two signatures. On the other hand, it is extremely unlikely that the signatures of two honest users cause detection. In fact, it will also be hard for an adversary to cause detection based on an honest user's signature and one of its own signatures, since the proof of knowledge that is part of any valid signature requires the adversary to actually know a value x congruent to the private key x i of the honest user (modulo the group order). Of course, private keys are supposed to be well protected from an adversary.
Linking signatures of the same user, but within different time frames will be difficult. Loosely speaking, the proof of knowledge will not aid an adversary in linking signatures since it is a NIZKproof. Furthermore, the value H(T ) x i can be regarded to be independent of the rest of the signature if H is modelled as a random oracle. Here we use the fact that the rest of the signature is based on a group signature scheme where time frames are not defined, so H will not be queried on T in that part of the signature. Moreover, if the original group signature scheme was secure, that part of the list signature will not give the signer away. All that remains are the values H(T ) x i for a fixed x i but various T . Under the random oracle model, the elements output by H are uncorrelated or, more precisely, even for an adversary who can adaptively choose the values T j the distribution H(T j ) j=1,...,m will be indistinguishable from the uniform distribution over G m , provided all the T j are different. But then the DDH assumption will guarantee that the distribution (H(T j ), H(T j ) x ) j=1,...,m where x is a randomly chosen exponent, is computationally indistinguishable from the uniform distribution over G 2m , since it is well known that the hardness of the DDH problem based on quadruples implies the hardness of the DDH problem based on any 2m-tuple as long as m is polynomial in the security parameter.
The idea of detection using exponentiation with a random but public group element as base and a power related to a private key also appears in the context of for instance toggling schemes [31] , fair E-cash systems [32, 18] , direct anonymous attestation [11] and traceable signatures [25] . We note that it can be advantageous to use a different group than G for detection (cf. [11] ) to improve the efficiency or to ease the implementation of identification.
Identification. A list signature scheme providing detection can also be extended to provide identification of dishonest group members using techniques based on secret sharing. For convenience, assume that the group G is of large prime order q.
The easiest 2-out-of-q threshold sharing schemes for Z q that exists is one based on lines. Let s ∈ Z q be a secret, then the dealer picks a random point r ∈ Z q and hands out shares (X, r + sX) ∈ Z 2 q , i.e., points on a line. Given one point the slope s is still information theoretically hidden, but clearly two points (or, shares) define the line and allow retrieval of the line.
A list signature scheme can be equipped with the identification functionality by requiring that, as part of a list signature, the user releases a point on a line that contains its identity. Obviously a user should not be allowed to use the same point twice, but this can easily by ensured by using a hash of the message to be signed. A problem though is that signatures in different time frames should not reveal anything, which basically requires a fresh line for each time frame. This technicality can be overcome by exploiting the linearity of the secret sharing scheme and conducting the secret sharing scheme on the exponents in Z q , handing out shares (X, g r+sX ) instead. The secret s will remain the same, but the randomness r will depend both on the time frame and the identity of the user (basically by performing Diffie Hellman key agreement in some sense). Although only g s can be reconstructed this way, identification of the user is ensured.
Small Groups
In this section we describe how the construction outlined above can be accomplished using standard discrete logarithm based tools and the technique of Section 3, to form a list signature with identification capability. The scheme is actually of the ad-hoc type, meaning that the group of members belonging to a public key only need to be determined at the time of signing.
Setup The group manager picks a group G q of prime order q and publishes (G q , q), together with two randomly chosen generators g and h of G q . The Decision Diffie-Hellman problem is assumed to be hard in the group G q . Further, cryptographic hash functions H : {0, 1} * → G q and H : {0, 1} * → Z q are defined. Note that the group manager does not have a private key and is not involved in the remainder of the list signature scheme. Join A user joins by picking a random x ∈ Z q and publishing y = g x , together with a non-interactive proof of knowledge of x. Henceforth we will assume that user i is legally bound to its public key y i and we denote x i = log g y i .
To sign anonymously on behalf of a group of users, the group public key is computed as the concatenation of the public keys of the individual members. Sign Let (y 1 , . . . , y N ) be a group public key and let i ∈ {1, . . . , N }. User i wishing to sign a message m in time frame T first computes t = H(T ), s = H(T, 1) and X = H (m, T ). It then publishes values T 1 = t x i and T 2 = s x i y X i together with a non-interactive proof of knowledge that for some i ∈ {1, . . . , N } it holds that the user knows an x ∈ Z q such that y i = g x , T 1 = t x , and T 2 = (sg X ) x without revealing x nor i. Here the technique developed in Section 3 can be employed to save work. The user applies a Chaum-Pedersen proof of knowledge of log t T 1 = log sg X T 2 and performs a 1-out-of-N proof of knowledge of log tg T 1 y i for some i ∈ {1, . . . , N }. Verify Verify that the public key is correct, i.e., only consists of values resulting from the Join protocol, and verify the non-interactive proof included in the signature. Match If two signatures (T 1 , T 2 ) on message m and (T 1 , T 2 ) on message m based on the same time frame T satisfy T 1 = T 1 compute y = (T 2 /T 2 ) 1/(X−X ) , where X = H (m, T ) and X = H (m , T ). Identify the double-signer as user i with y = y i .
Security
Our claim is that the above scheme is secure in the Random Oracle model under the DDH assumption. Since the group manager is only involved in Setup, it may be totally corrupted, provided it cannot introduce a somehow weak group G q during key generation.
Correctness We first remark that we only have to contend ourselves with the first clause, since we are dealing with a scheme with identification. The first clause is trivially satisfied, since an honest user will only ever commit to a public key y for which it knows log g y.
Soundness This follows from the soundness of the zero-knowledge proof used in the signing algorithm and the fact that, under anonymity, the adversary cannot know the private keys of honest users.
Anonymity This boils down to a straightforward reduction to the DDH assumption.
Efficiency
Just to give a flavour of the efficiency of the scheme above, suppose it is implemented based on an elliptic curve group with log 2 q ≈ 160. In that case a single user's public key consists of one point on the elliptic curve, taking about 160 bits in total (using standard point compression techniques). The public key of a group of N members will be approximately 160N bits long. A signature takes 320 bits for publishing T 1 and T 2 plus approximately an additional 320 bits per group member for the proof of knowledge, i.e., a grand total of 320(N + 1) bits for a signature.
Large Groups
Our proposal is based on the group signature scheme of Ateniese et al. [2] . In a nutshell, each user is issued with a triple (A, e, x) such that A e = a x a 0 mod n, where n is a safe RSA modulus, see Section 2.
The pair (A, e) is public and linked to the identity of the user, the value x is its private key. A signature is basically a proof of knowledge of such a pair, made non-interactively using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic (this is also where the message to be signed is used). Note that it is also possible to design a list signature scheme from the group signature scheme of Camenisch and Groth [16] that is an improvement of the Ateniese et al. scheme. The scheme still needs a revocation scheme to be complete. Various revocation principles have been proposed ( [3] , [10] , [17] and [27] ), but [3] and [10] are not efficient enough and [27] is broken. We will use the result by Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [17] based on earlier work by Barić and Pfitzmann [4] . Basically, a revocation manager publishes u and v such that v = u Q i e i over all group members i. Camenisch and Lysyanskaya fix a value for u and, by changing v, users are added or removed from the qualified group. To determine the qualified group, two sets are maintained, E add and E del . The set of qualified users is precisely the set E qual = E add \E del and the public key should at any time satisfy v = u Q e i ∈E qual e i (if the public key is corrupt, we will by definition assume that no user is qualified).
Clearly qualified users will be able to prove knowledge of an e-th root of v with a corresponding membership certificate by computing B = u ( Q e i ∈E qual e i )/e , for e ∈ E qual . Camenisch and Lysyanskaya however do not publish u and show that in fact the scheme can be made more efficient: users only need to update their "root" when other users are added or deleted and this update is linear in the number of modifications, but independent of the number of users that do not change status.
We claim that publishing u is beneficiary for two reasons. First of all it ensures that qualified users always have a membership certificate, even in the face of a corrupt revocation manager. Secondly it allows us to present an alternative solution that removes the update necessity when users are added. Normally when a user with exponent e is added, the revocation manager computes a new value v by v e and hence all other users have to raise their private values to the power e as well to keep track of the right root of v. However, therevocation manager might equally well update u by u 1/e and computing v 1/e for the new group member. Since this does not change v, other users do not need to change their respective B's. Note however that this trick falls outside of the standard dynamic accumulator theory used by Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [17] , so we cannot fully copy their security proof. Moreover, this requires either that the group manager can compute roots, or that the group manager already knows a predetermined set of roots for the initial value of u, and it uses the corresponding e's during the Join-protocol.
We have to introduce some security parameters and refer to the original work by Ateniese et al. [2] for more details. Following Brickell et al. [11] , we provide recommendations for the parameters (in parentheses). We will need > 1 and integers k (80) and l p (1024). Moreover, λ 1 (4258), λ 2 (4096), γ 1 (4422) and γ 2 (4260) will denote lengths that define the intervals Λ = (2 λ 1 − 2 λ 2 , 2 λ 1 + 2 λ 2 ) and Γ = (2 γ 1 −2 γ 2 , 2 γ 1 +2 γ 2 ). Furthermore, we will need a cryptographic hash function H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} k for the non-interactive proofs of knowledge.
Setup Protocol
Setup is run by the group manager in two different incarnations: one called M J running the join protocol and the other one responsible for revocation M R . The join manager is the most important one in the sense that M J should remain uncorrupted to achieve soundness, whereas M R may be corrupted.
1. Manager M J selects distinct primes p and q of size l p , such that p = 2p + 1 and q = 2q + 1 are primes. It computes and publishes the modulus n = pq together with a proof that n is a safe RSA-modulus (see [1] ). It keeps the factorisation of n as private key. We assume that hash function H : {0, 1} * → QR(n) is defined as well. In the random oracle model, H can be assumed to produce a distribution statistically close to the uniform one of generators of QR(n) and that different calls to H produce independent and hence uncorrelated outcomes unless the calls are on the same input. In particular, nothing will 'leak' about respective discrete logarithms, not even to M J who knows the factorisation of n. 2. Manager M J publishes random elements a, a 0 , g and h in QR(n), and it sets up an, initially empty, database DB. 3. Manager M R chooses random elements u, f in QR(n), sets v = u and publishes u, v and f . It sets up, initially empty, sets E add and E del . For anonymity against M R it is essential that f is uncorrelated to (g, h).
We denote the group's public key by pk = (n, a, a 0 , g, h, u, v, f ) together with DB, E add , E del , and denote M J 's private key by sk M = p . Note that M R does not have a private key specific to the group signature scheme, although it is implicitly understood to have a legally binding key outside the group signature scheme in order to sign its part of the group public key (u, v, f ).
Join Protocol
This algorithm is based on the Join-protocol that is part of the group signature scheme by Ateniese et al. [2] .
1. User i and manager M J engage in a two-party protocol, at the end of which the user knows x ∈ Λ and the manager knows a x mod n. The protocol is such that the user cannot influence the choice (or distribution) of x and the manager learns nothing beyond a x mod n (this can be formalized [25] ). 2. The manager picks a prime e ∈ Γ not yet in DB and computes A = (a x a 0 ) 1/e mod n. It sends (A, e) to the user. 3. The user checks that neither A nor e already occurs in the database, that e is a prime in Γ and that A e = a x a 0 mod n. If so, it returns (A, e) together with a legally binding signature on it incorporating (a, a 0 , n). 4. Manager M J adds (A, e) to the database, together with user i's identity and signature. 5. Manager M R checks that e is a prime in Γ that occurs only once in the database. If so, it adds e to E add , sets B = v, sends B to the user, and updates the public key by v = v e mod n. In our variation M R leaves v unchanged, updates u = u 1/e and sends B = v 1/e to the user.
During this protocol, a new group member i will obtain from the managers a private key sk i = x and a membership certificate (A, e, B) such that A e = a x a 0 mod n and B e = v mod n. Note that the membership certificate is public: (A, e) is part of the database and B can be recomputed based on u, v and the sets E add and E del .
Revoke Protocol
In case of a revocation of group member i with membership certificate (A i , e i , B i ), manager M R has to compute a new value for v being v 1/e i mod n, add e i to E del and publish the new v and E del .
Although it seems revocation requires an e i -th root computation on M R 's behalf, involving the factorisation of n, the group manager can actually recompute v based on the fixed element u and the sets E add and E del . Note that the workload for the group manager for revoking one group member is linear in the number of participants this way. If M R does know the factorisation of n, it can obviously perform the root computation directly and independently of the number of participants.
If it is undesired to give M R access to the private key of M J , an efficient solution is the introduction of a second modulus n of which only M R knows the factorisation. In this case u, v, and f will be elements of QR(n ). Using a different group for the revocation manager only marginally complicates the proofs needed in the Sign protocol (the main tool is a proof of knowledge of a discrete logarithm with respect to different modulus, see e.g. [8, 7] ).
Update Protocol
After a Registration protocol, group member i (using E add ) has to replace B i in its membership certificate by B e i mod n, where e is a new entry of E add . However, if our variation is used where M R updates u instead of v, old group members do not have to update their key when new members join.
After a Revocation protocol revoking user i, each group member j = i (using E del ) has to replace the value B j in its certificate by B b j v a mod n where a and b are such that ae j + be i = 1 and where e i is a new entry of E del .
In either case, the user j always knows a pair (e j , B j ) such that B e j j = v mod n.
Sign Protocol
In the original scheme of Ateniese et al., the signer first publishes T 1 = A i g w mod n, T 2 = h w mod n, and T 3 = g e i h w mod n, where w is a randomly chosen value, followed by a proof of knowledge of e i , x i , w, and w = e i w such that T e 1 = a x a 0 g w , T 2 = h w , T e i 2 = h w , and T 3 = g e i h w , all modulo n. The proof of knowledge includes range checks on x and e, but does not involve the primality of e. The main tool is a proof of knowledge of a discrete logarithm in a group of unknown order (see e.g. [14, 8, 7, 25] ).
Our first observation is that publishing T 3 and explicitly proving knowledge of w is actually superfluous in the above scheme (or, for that matter, in a whole range of schemes derived from it). Our second observation is that T 1 and T 2 both seem necessary, even if opening of the signature based on knowledge of α = log g h is not required. Our third observation is that publishing H(T ) x mod n will allow detectability, where T is the time frame. Finally, we remark that including Bf w in the signature will show that the user is qualified (cf. [17] ).
This leads us to the following signing algorithm for message m, time frame T and based on membership certificate (A, e, x, B).
1. The signer picks w at random modulo n, and computes
where t = H(T ), as before.
2. The signer proves knowledge of e ∈ Γ, x ∈ Λ, and existence of w (= ew) such that
where the message to be signed is hashed into the challenge.
The proof of knowledge is fairly standard, and its size is slightly larger than 6 log 2 n bits.
Verify and Match Protocols
A verifier can check the validity of a signature by simply verifying the proof of knowledge. Moreover, everyone who has access to all signatures for a particular time frame can easily see if a user has signed twice or more by observing the value of T 4 . The user cannot cheat (by using another value) because T 4 is linked with T 1 by the proof of knowledge and the private key x.
Security of the Proposed List Signature Scheme
In this section, we informally examine the security of our list signature scheme.
Correctness The first clause of correctness is satisfied because an honest user i will only sign a pair (A, e) if it knows an x such that (A, e, x) is a valid certificate. Moreover, a user will only be classified as qualified if e ∈ E qual and v = u Q e∈E qual e , from which B satisfying B e = v can be efficiently reconstructed. Hence any honest qualified user will have the knowledge to pass through the NIZK proof required for a signature (where we use completeness of this proof).
The second clause of correctness is also satisfied, since the only way an adversary can cause detection is by posting a signature for the same time frame with t x , including a proof of knowledge of a value x such that x = x mod p q where x is the user's private key. But if the adversary knows such an x , it can also identify signatures from that user, breaching anonymity.
Soundness We claim that the list signature scheme is sound against attacks not involving the Join manager M J . Note that M J can always introduce ghost members that have valid certificates but that do not appear in the database. This holds even if the revocation manager is not corrupted and uses a different group of order unknown to M J , since the ghost users can use e's already in use by honest users. Soundness is based on the following reasoning.
1. Without loss of generality we can assume that the adversary knows a value α = log h g and a value β = log h f , since knowledge of these values only helps the adversary. 2. If an adversary posts a valid signature (T 1 , T 2 , T 3 , T 4 ), it also proves, by virtue of the soundness of the zero-knowledge proof in the signature, that it knows e ∈ Γ and x ∈ Λ for which an w exists such that T e 1 = a x a 0 g w , T e 2 = h w , and T e 3 = vf w . But then (T
Since we assume the adversary knows α and β, it can compute a valid membership certificate (A, e, x, B) based on any valid signature it issues. Note that the random oracle model is used for the soundness of the NIZK-proof. 3. By virtue of the proof of equality of x in T 4 and x in the membership certificate, each certificate can be used only once within the same time frame without triggering detection. 4. Under the strong RSA assumption, the Join-protocol cannot be used to obtain more certificates than queried for [2, Theorem 1]. 5. Under anonymity of the users (see below), the value x of honest users is unknown to the adversary, hence certificates of honest users are of no avail. 6. One cannot use e's in use by honest users because of the security (under the strong RSA assumption) of the dynamic accumulator used for group management [17] .
Anonymity First of all, if the Join-protocol is correctly implemented, it will only leak a x mod n (some care has to be taken to shield the protocol against concurrent attacks).
In the random oracle model the proof of knowledge that is part of the signature can be proven statistically zero-knowledge (note that concurrency is not an issue, since a signature is a one-round protocol). Hence all that leaks from a signature is the quadruple (Ag w , h w , Bf w , t x ). An adversary that could distinguish anything about A or B would break the semantic security of ElGamal encryption, which is hard under the Decisional Diffie Hellman assumption. Hence a signature essentially only leaks t x . Luckily the problem of distinguishing the distribution (a, t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t l , a x , t 1 , . . . , t x l ) with a and t 1 , . . . , t l uniformly random in QR(n) and x in Γ from the distribution of 2l + 2 uniformly distributed elements in QR(n) reduces to standard DDH.
Efficiency
The group's public key consists of a 2048-bit modulus n and six elements of QR(n), taking in total 14336 bits. A signature involves the posting of four elements in QR(n) together with a proof of knowledge of about 3 elements slightly bigger than n 2 . In total a signature can be expected to take about 23250 bits. Hence for the schemes presented in this work, at around 70 participants the large group scheme becomes more efficient than the small group scheme.
We would like to point out though that recently more efficient group signature schemes have appeared for large groups, that can also be adapted to list signature schemes. In fact, the direct anonymous attestation scheme by Brickell et al. [11] is already very close to a list signature scheme if the TPM and the host in their scheme are regarded as a single user. On the downside we would like to note that presently all large group signature schemes seem to be based on the Strong RSA assumption (and the DDH), whereas the small group schemes can be based on just a group in which the DDH is hard, allowing groups over elliptic curves. Given the current track record of attacking the respective problems [28] , it is to be expected that the moduli for the large group schemes have to grow faster than the group sizes of the elliptic curves, thus the break-even point can be expected to shift in favour of small group schemes.
Application to Electronic Voting
Some proposals for electronic voting schemes use blind signatures as a building block. In such schemes, each voter is issued a single blind signature for use in a particular election. During the election, the voter uses its blind signature to authenticate a vote, which needs to be submitted via an anonymous channel. The election result is determined by collecting all submitted votes and accompanying blind signatures. The security of such voting schemes relies on trust in the party that issues the blind signatures and the fact that blind signatures cannot be forged. Of course, each blind signature should be accepted at most once to prevent voters from voting multiple times. Finally, ballot secrecy is achieved since the blind signatures used to authenticate a vote do not reveal any information on the identity of the voter who submitted it.
We note that list signatures can be used to replace blind signatures in such voting schemes. Instead of authenticating a vote by means of a blind signature, a list signature is used, preserving the security and privacy properties of the voting scheme. A major advantage of the use of list signatures over blind signatures is that a voter does not need to get a blind signature for each election in which the voter needs to take part. Another potential advantage is that the computational complexity and storage complexity improves for the voters. In a list signature scheme, the storage for a user is O(1) and the work for generating a signature is also O(1) (assuming a scheme for large groups). Also, there is no practical limit on the number of signatures that can be produced by a user.
